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Petitioner Thomas Heerman, through counsel, Mitchell R. Barker, now replies
as follows in support of this appeal. Specifically, this document replies to the State's
Brief ofAppellee.

III.

SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENT

The trial court erred in various respects, and has not really been rehabilitated by
the State's Reply Brief. Its discretion was abused in dismissing this post-conviction
relief case, given that during most of the period the matter was pending, the parties
were relying on their Joint Stipulation Suspending Further Proceedings. Other errors
also favor reversal, such as failure to consider the fact that the defense did nothing to
move the case along, lack of any evidence of prejudice, and evidentiary mistakes.

IV.
1.

REPLY ARGUMENT

The State has not rebutted Mr. Heerman's arguments. The parties are

in general agreement as to most of the facts, and the appUcable legal standards. A
proper application of those rules calls for a reversal of the dismissal, so Mr. Heerman
can have the day in court he never had, and test the merits of his imprisonment.1 The
1

After years behind bars, Mr. Heerman has been releasedfromprison on parol.
However, his life remains under full control of the Department of Corrections, and is not
Heerman v. State, Reply Brief!

State has largely just repeated some of the standards, emphasizing those which it
believes benefit its cause.

2.

The State fails to explain away the Stipulation. Both parties willingly

agreed to a stay until after the parol hearing. It is true that Judge Payne never approved
(or contemporaneously disapproved) the Stipulation.2 But it is equally clear that the
parties were waiting, refraining from action in reliance on the agreement to stay. The
period of reliance encompassed most of the time when the case was inactive.
The State's same Deputy Attorney General has been involved since late 1999
when this matter was filed. Way after the fact, she suggests (e.g. Reply footnote 5) that
she assumed the Board of Pardons hearing was coming up within the next year.
However, thinks is not a sworn statement, affidavit, or any other admissible evidence.
And more importantly, her private assumption is of no legal (or logical) consequence.
What matters is what was expressly agreed in the Joint Stipulation Suspending Further
Proceedings, whose very name makes such an assumption unreasonable.3 The State's
profound silencefromthe signing of that document until the court's own Order to Show
Cause over two years later reveals that, just like Mr. Heerman, it was relying on the

"free" of the conviction entered years ago.
2

See Judge Payne's observation to that effect at R. 591.

3

R., 248-259.
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agreed stay. It is noteworthy that while the trial judge issued orders to show cause on
failure to prosecute, the State never moved to dismiss for that or any other reason.

3.

The State cannot pick and choose the factors to consider. It lists and

pays lip service to the five Westinghouse4 factors the trial judge is to consider on a
claimed failure to prosecute.5 But as to some of the factors, mere lip service is given,
rather than a substantive analysis. The second factor, for example, is the conduct of
both parties.6 The State recites that the conduct of both parties is to be examined, but
then goes on to argue that all duty is on the plaintiff (here the petitioner).7 Although
there is dicta in a case or two that emphasizes the plaintiff's duty, case after case cited
to in the Appellant's Opening Brief'note that both parties must advance the matter, not
just one. Here, of course, neither did, since both were operating under the stipulated
delay. Yet Westinghouse and virtually all of its progeny, bothfromthis Court and the

4

See, Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Larsen Contractor, Inc. 544 P.2d 876,
879 (Utah 1975).
5

See, Brief of Appellee, pp. 10-11.

6

Dismissal after three years pendency was reversed, where the court was "not
overly impressed that the defendants themselves were overly diligent or manifest any
particular haste in getting the pretrial discovery procedures completed and on with the
trial." Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Larsen Contractor, Inc. 544 P.2d 876, 879
(Utah 1975).
7

See, Brief ofAppellee, pp. 12-13.
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Court of Appeals, affirm the rule8 of mutual responsibility.
When a prisoner must pay for his own counsel in petitioning for post-conviction
relief, it is certainly understandable that if there is a Board of Pardons hearing on the
horizon, he may wish to wait for its outcome before extensive litigation efforts. And
if the defense is in accord with the delay, neither side should be penalized for abiding
by their mutual understanding. Conduct of the State which in effect acquiesces in delay
can offset the alleged failure to act by the plaintiff. See, Hartford Leasing v. State?
The second Westinghouse fad or goes hand in hand with the first: The
opportunity each party has had to move the case forward. And the third factor follows
naturally: What each of the parties has done to move the case forward.10 The State
recites that it filed its Answer (which it did very early on), and points to nothing else
that it did. There is no cogent explanation of how it lacked the same opportunity as Mr.
Heerman had to advance the case through the courts.

4.

The final Westinghouse factor, prejudice to the defense and possible

injustice to the petitioner, falls squarely on the side of reversal. The State rewords
8

One such authority is Johnson v. Firebrand, Inc., 571 P.2d 1368, 1369 (Utah
1977). The defendant must uphold its own end of the procedural burden, not just the
plaintiff. See, Hartford Leasing v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 701 (Utah App. 1994).
9

888 P.2d 694, 700 (Utah App. 1994).

10

See, Westinghouse, supra, construed by, for example, Rohan v. Boseman, 46
P.3d 753, 758 (Utah App. 2002).
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the factor shghtly, as "[w]hat difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the other
side."11 As convenient as it may seem to speculate as to what prejudice "may" have
been caused to the State, none was shown and, apparently, none exists.
Indeed, the trial court found, "There is no direct evidence before the Court as to
prejudice which has resulted by the delay of mis case." Ruling & Order, par. 48.12 It
is not enough for Judge Payne to take the laboring oar, speculating as to prejudice when
the State has made no effort to establish any. The "prejudice" surely must be
something more than the prejudice which exists in any case as the facts grow colder
with time. The absence of a showing of prejudice makes it quite unlikely that dismissal
is appropriate. See, Wright v. Howe.12 Otherwise, prejudice shown would hardly be
a factor.
The time which passes is just one of thefivefactors, and passage of time alone
cannot be grounds for dismissal for failure to prosecute. Westinghouse, supra.,4 Yet
here there is the mere passage of time, strongly mitigated by the State's express
acquiescence. Of the many cases discussing the factors cited in Mr. Heerman's opening
Briefon Appeal,15 the few which affirm a trial judge's dismissal for failure to prosecute
11

Brief of Appellee @p. 15.

12

R. @ p. 589.

13

46 Utah 588, 150 P. 956 (1915).

14

544 P. 2d @ 879.

15

See Brief on Appeal, especially pp. 16-24.
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have unique factors, which seem to cry out for dismissal. None of those factors exists
here, and in fact the contrary is true: this case's facts dictate in favor of reversing the
dismissal.

5. Injustice would result if the dismissal is allowed to stand. And "whether
injustice may result from the dismissal" is consistently observed to be the "most
important" of all of the Westinghouse factors.16 That case itself states that while the
passage of time is relevant, "it is even more important to keep in mind that the very
reason for the existence of the courts is to afford disputants an opportunity to be heard
and to do justice between them."17 It's an issue of fair play but, more importantly, it
is another way of saying that in this Country we don't take away one's meritorious
claim without due process - - without a fair opportunity to present the case in court to
see whether it merits the relief sought in the complaint (here the Petition). The passage
of time alone appears never to be enough to destroy the right to a day in court.
Westinghouse, supra.1*
Existence of and reliance upon the Stipulation to Suspend Proceedings is one

16

See, e.g., Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State University, 813 P.2d 1216 (Utah
App. 1991); Hartford Leasing v. State, 888 P.2d 694 (Utah App. 1994), both citing
Westinghouse v. Larsen, 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975).
17

Westinghouse, supra, 544 P.2d @ 879.

18

Id., 544 P.2d @ 879.
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of the reasons why injustice would result from dismissal. Another is the fact that he has
tried his best to advance his cause during all periods when the Stipulation was in effect.
But, due to problems with his counsel,19 and particularly problems with obtaining new
counsel from the prison,20 he was thwarted in those efforts. In other words, the delay
was in all fairness mostly not chargeable to Mr. Heerman. The history of his efforts to
find counsel and get them to perform is storied, and covers pretty much the same
windows of time (6 months which passed before the Stipulation and 8 months after
Judge Payne announced to Mr. Heerman that he could no longer claim refuge in it) as
are most germane in considering failure to prosecute.

6.

The rejected exhibits should have been received. Mr. Heerman's

opening Brief on Appeal

established why ten exhibits which were refused ought to

have been admitted into evidence.

They were letters and other documents

demonstrating diligent efforts by Mr. Heerman to find attorneys, instruct his attorneys

19

Judge Payne himself found mat Mr. Heerman allowing dismissal arose from
incorrect (or at least incomplete) advicefromhis counsel. Findings ofFact, Conclusions
ofLaw & Order Vacating Dismissal, Findings par. 6, Conclusions par.4, 5, 6 ("The Court
Concludes that Petitioner did not knowingly allow the case to be dismissed") and 7.
20

Judge Payne himself found that "it is true between June 18,2001 (when
Petitioner began his search for new counsel) and September 25, 2001 (when Mr. Skordas
entered his appearance), the Petitioner did have difficulty obtaining counsel." Ruling &
Order, pg. 8, par. 5; R. 584-593.
21

Opening Brief of Appellant, aka Brief on Appeal, @ pp. 33-35.
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to actively prosecute the case, and to keep the trial court updated on his efforts in those
areasfromtime to time. The items were offered to show the letters were sent and that
Mr. Heerman thereby was demonstrating his good faith actions. They were not
assertions, and were not offered to prove the truth of their contents. For example, a
letter in which Mr. Heerman tells an attorney he'd like to employ his services has
import only because it demonstrates an effort. It is not offered to prove, for example,
that he really did want that lawyer. It is not, then, hearsay,22 and no exception to the
hearsay rule is even necessary.
The State's response is to simply argue, without authority, that the items are
hearsay nevertheless. It would be a strange situation if a party were ordered to appear
and show cause why his case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute, but was
prohibitedfromproving it by showing his communications with attorneys and with the
Judge and he Clerk of the Court. Here Judge Payne even refused to consider letters to
him which were found in the court's file. True that such letters would not be
admissible in determining the facts and their merits. But significant room must
necessarily be permitted in deterniimng a purely procedural issue like failure to
prosecute or its opposite.

Everything that the court has available is helpful and

relevant.

UtahR. Evid. 801(c)(2-3).
Heerman v. State, Reply Brief8

V.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Heerman has surely not been perfect in prosecuting this case, and maybe
that should not surprise us in light of where he has had to make his home these last few
years, the inconsistency of his legal counsel and their bad advice. All of the factors
here, not the least of which is the Joint Stipulation Suspending Future Proceedings
covering most of the time about which the trial judge was concerned, combine to make
a trial on the merits appropriate. Mr. Heerman declares his innocence in all soberness,
and should be permitted an opportunity to establish that his plea agreement was entered
into as a result of still more bad legal advice, amounting to the ineffective assistance
of counsel. He should also be heard on his claim that counsel labored under an
apparent conflict of interest since, unbeknownst to Mr. Heerman, he was purporting to
defend him and negotiate a plea agreement, while simultaneously running for
prosecutor. See, Petition for Relief Under Post-Conviction Remedies Act.23
Respectfully submitted this 5TH day of May, 2004.

$

Mitchell R. Barker
Attorney for Petitioner Heerman

R., pp. 1 through 17.
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VI.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 6 TH day of May, 2004,1 caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following individual at the indicated
address:
Erin Riley, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

Mitchell R. Barker
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